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No. 20160173-SC 
No. 20130924-CA 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner /Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
THOMAS RANDALL AINSWORTH, 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. 
Respondent/ Cross-Petitioner is incarcerated. 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-PETITIONER 
ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
As outlined in the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner (Rspt.Br.), this 
Court should affirm Ainsworth because a unanimous panel of the court of 
appeals correctly concluded that the Measurable Amount Statute's second-
degree-felony designation violates the uniform operation of laws provision. See 
Rspt.Br. 12-25. As explained by the court of appeals, the Measurable Amount 
Statute is unconstitutional because it subjects "unimpaired users of Schedule I 
and II controlled substances ... to a greater charge for what is otherwise 
[statutorily] defined to be a lesser crime." State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, 
1116, 365 P.3d 1227. 
Alternatively, this Court should affirm the result reached by the court of 
appeals for either of the following reasons: (1) the Measurable Amount Statute's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
second-degree-felony designation violates state and federal due process, or (2) 
the Measurable Amount Statute's prescription exemption violates Utah's uniform 
operation oflaws clause. See Rspt.Br. 25-37. Additionally, this Court should 
reverse the court of appeals' decision on the sentencing issue because the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
imposing consecutive sentences. See Rspt.Br. 37-43. 
This brief replies to the State's response to the cross-petition. See Order 
dated July 20, 2016. This brief is "limited to answering any new matter set forth 
in the opposing brief." Utah R. App. P. 24(c). The brief does not restate 
arguments from the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner or address matters 
that do not merit reply. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
decision on the sentencing issue because the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences. 
The court of appeals correctly vacated Ainsworth's second-degree-felony 
convictions and remanded for entry of third-degree felonies and resentencing. 
State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ,I,I13-19, 22,365 P.3d 1227. Rather than 
stopping there, however, the court of appeals went on to address the trial court's 
original sentencing decision and ruled that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. See id. ,I,I19-21. 
2 
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The cross-petition issue on certiorari is: "Whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
consecutive sentences." Order dated July 20, 2016. Ainsworth asks this Court to 
reverse because the court of appeals "erred in concluding that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences" in two ways: The 
court of appeals erred by making the conclusion at all, or, alternatively, the court 
of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's consecutive sentencing order. See 
Rspt.Br. 37-43. 
In the Reply Brief of Petitioner and Brief of Cross-Respondent (Pet.Rply.), 
the State argues that the question of whether the court of appeals erred by 
addressing the consecutive sentencing issue is not before this Court on certiorari. 
See Pet.Rply.Br. 30-31. Alternatively, the State argues that the court of appeals 
correctly addressed the trial court's consecutive sentencing decision, see 
Pet.Rply.Br. 31-33, and correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. See Pet.Rply.Br. 34-40. For the 
reasons stated below and in the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner, the 
State's claims fail. See Rspt.Br. 37-43. 
First, the question of whether the court of appeals erred by addressing the 
consecutive sentencing issue is properly before this Court on certiorari. "In 
determining the scope of an order granting certiorari," this Court is "guided by 
rule 49(a)(4) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." State v. Leber, 2009 UT 
59, ,I10, 216 P.3d 964. Rule 49(a)(4) "states that '[o]nly the questions set forth in 
3 
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the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."' 
Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,r10 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)) (emphasis in 
original). "Questions presented for review within the petition for certiorari 'will 
be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein."' Leber, 
2009 UT 59, ,I10 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). "Furthermore, 'this rule 
should be construed broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, 
however peripheral."' Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,r10. But "[i]ssues not presented in the 
petition for certiorari, or if presented, not included in the order granting 
certiorari or fairly encompassed within such issues, are not properly before this 
Court on the merits." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (emphasis 
added). 
Here, this Court should reach the question of whether the court of appeals 
erred by addressing the consecutive sentencing issue because the issue was raised 
in the cross-petition for certiorari and is fairly included within the order granting 
the cross-petition. 
Ainsworth raised the question of whether the court of appeals erred by 
addressing the consecutive sentencing issue in the conditional cross-petition for 
certiorari (Cross-Pet.). In the cross-petition, Ainsworth asked this Court to 
address the court of appeals' sentencing decision based on two theories: 
Whether the court of appeals erred by addressing the consecutive 
sentencing issue after it had already reduced Ainsworth's convictions 
and remanded with an order for resentencing or, in the alternative, 
whether the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court did 
4 
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not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ainsworth to serve three 
consecutive terms of one-to-fifteen years in prison. 
Cross-Pet. 4. Regarding the first theory, Ainsworth argued that, having vacated 
Ainsworth's second-degree-felony convictions and remanded for imposition of 
third-degree felonies and resentencing, the court of appeals should have left the 
question of whether to run the third-degree felonies consecutively to the trial 
court to decide on remand. Compare Cross-Pet. 17-18; with Rspt.Br. 37-39. 
This Court granted the cross-petition on the following issue: "Whether the 
Court of Appeals erred in concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in imposing consecutive sentences." Order dated July 20, 2016. This question 
fairly includes both theories presented in the cross-petition. As argued by 
Ainsworth in the Brief of Respondent and Cross Petitioner, the court of appeals 
erred in concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion either 
because the court of appeals should not have made the conclusion at all or, in the 
alternative, because the decision the court of appeals made was incorrect. See 
Rspt.Br. 37-43. 
Thus, this Court should address whether it was improper for the court of 
appeals to address the consecutive sentencing issue because the issue was raised 
in the cross-petition for certiorari and is fairly included within the order granting 
the cross-petition. 
Second, it was improper for the court of appeals to address the consecutive 
sentencing issue. Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure says: "If a 
5 
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judgment of conviction is reversed [in a criminal case], a new trial shall be held 
unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order 
is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be 
executed." Utah R. App. P. 3o(b); see Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a). Further, rule 30 
says: "If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all 
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to 
the final determination of the case." Utah R. App. P. 3o(a) (emphasis added). 
The State acknowledges rule 30, but argues that it was appropriate for the 
court of appeals to address the consecutive sentencing issue because rule 30 
"does not preclude the Court from addressing other issues that are likely to arise 
on remand for resentencing." Pet.Br. 32-33. 
But the State's claim is contrary to rule 30 and case law. Resentencing is 
not "a new trial," and sentencing decisions are not "questions of law." Utah R. 
App. P. 3o(a). Rather, sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. See LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ,I16, 337 P.3d 254. The court of 
appeals "vacate[d] Ainsworth's convictions and remand[ed] with instructions for 
the district court to enter his convictions as third-degree felonies and to 
resentence him accordingly." Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ,I22. It is clear from the 
opinion that the court of appeals intended the trial court to conduct a new 
sentencing hearing. See id. ,I19 (noting that the issue of consecutive sentences is 
"likely to arise on remand" because the Ainsworth decision will "require that the 
district court also resentence [Ainsworth]"). Having ordered the trial court to 
6 
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resentence Ainsworth, the court of appeals should have left the question of what 
sentence to impose to the trial court on remand. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 
P.3d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (vacating conviction, imposing reduced conviction, 
and remanding for resentencing); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646,657 (Utah 1989) 
(same); State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1987) (same), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, ,I12, 150 P.3d 
532. 
As pointed out by the State, "later developments regarding [Ainsworth's] 
rehabilitation, conduct in prison, and programming during appeal" are not 
contained "in the record" on appeal. Pet.Br. 33. Rather, those "developments" are 
"new, and unknown" to the appellate courts. Pet.Br. 33. In other words, 
resentencing will require the trial court to consider new information that was not 
available to the court of appeals. See Rspt.Br. 39. This is why it was incorrect for 
the court of appeals to address the consecutive sentencing issue. Having vacated 
Ainsworth's second-degree-felony convictions and remanded for imposition of 
third-degree felonies and resentencing, the court of appeals should have left the 
question of whether to run the third-degree felonies consecutively to the trial 
court to decide on remand. See Rspt.Br. 37-39. 
Finally, the court of appeals incorrectly affirmed the trial court's 
consecutive sentencing order. The State asks this Court to affirm the court of 
appeals' decision affirming the sentence because the trial court stated at 
sentencing that it had considered the number of victims and Ainsworth's history, 
7 
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character, and rehabilitative needs. See Pet.Br. 34-40. The State claims that 
"[t]his is all that is required by statute." Pet.Br. 35. 
But it is not enough that a court says that it has considered "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code §76-3-401(2) (2012); see 
Pet.Br. 34-40. "[B]eing aware of' mitigating information and "taking it into 
account are not the same thing." State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 
1993). Thus, when a sentencing issue is raised on appeal, the appellate court will 
review the record to determine whether the trial court "may not have given 
adequate weight to" mitigating information. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 932, 
938 (Utah 1998). 
In LeBeau, Galli, State v. Smith, and Strunk, for example, this Court did 
not uphold the sentences simply because the sentencing judges were made aware 
of mitigating information. See LeBeau, 2014 UT 39,,r,r56-67; Galli, 967 P.2d at 
932,938; Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995); Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1300-
01. Instead, this Court reviewed the record and held that the sentencing judges 
abused their discretion by failing to adequately consider the mitigating 
information provided to them. See LeBeau, 2014 UT 39,,r,r56-67; Galli, 967 P.2d 
at 932,938; Smith, 909 P.2d at 244-45; Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1300-01. 
In LeBeau, this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to adequately consider "several mitigating factors raised by Mr. LeBeau," 
including "strong provocation," "good employment history," "strong family ties," 
8 
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and "an extended period of arrest-free time prior to" the offense. LeBeau, 2014 
UT 39, ,r,rn, 56-67. 
In Galli, this Court reversed because the trial court "may not have given 
adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances" or to the defendant's minor 
criminal history. Galli, 967 P.2d at 932, 938. In Smith, this Court reversed even 
though the trial court stated that it had considered the statutory factors, 
including "defendant's history, character, and rehabilitation possibilities," 
because the trial court failed to adequately consider that the crimes "arose out of 
one criminal episode" and that its sentence was "tantamount to a minimum 
mandatory life sentence." Smith, 909 P .2d at 244-45. 
And in Strunk, this Court faulted the trial court for failing to adequately 
consider defendant's age, noting "that the trial court was clearly aware of 
[defendant's] age," as it "was discussed" at the time of the guilty plea and at 
sentencing, but did not consider it as a mitigating circumstance. Strunk, 846 P .2d 
at 1300-01. 
In this case, Ainsworth's claim is not that the trial court failed to consider 
information that was never provided to the court. See Rspt.Br. 39-43. Rather, 
Ainsworth claims that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing because 
it failed to adequately consider the mitigating information provided about his 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs. See Rspt.Br. 39-43. As explained in 
the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner, the offenses arose from a single act 
of negligent driving. See id. Moreover, Ainsworth's deep remorse, change of heart 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
about rehabilitation, progress toward rehabilitation at the time of sentencing, 
family support, emotional stability, and ability to support himself suggest that 
"all three terms should be ordered to run concurrently to afford the Board of 
Pardons the flexibility to adjust [Ainsworth's] prison stay to match his progress in 
rehabilitation and preparation to return to society." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1302; see 
Rspt.Br. 39-43. 
Thus, for the reasons stated above and in the Brief of Respondent and 
Cross-Petitioner, Ainsworth asks this Court to reverse the court of appeals' 
decision on the sentencing issue because the court of appeals erred in concluding 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive 
sentences. See Rspt.Br. 37-43. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm Ainsworth because the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that the second-degree-felony designation in the Measurable Amount 
Statute violates Utah's uniform operation of laws clause. Alternatively, this Court 
should affirm the result reached by the court of appeals for either of the following 
reasons: (1) the Measurable Amount Statute's second-degree-felony designation 
violates the federal and state due process provisions, or (2) the Measurable 
Amount Statute's prescription exemption violates Utah's uniform operation of 
laws clause. Additionally, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision 
on the sentencing issue because the court of appeals erred in concluding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. 
10 
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